

SPIA 586a: Machine Learning for Policy Analysis

Week 9: Found Data

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Princeton

March 24–26, 2025

¹Many thanks to Ian Lundberg and the team of Dean Knox, Will Lowe and Jonathan Mummolo for slides on KLM.

Where We've Been and Where We're Going...

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- Last Week
 - ▶ designed data

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- Long Run
 - ▶ target tasks → data sources → guiding values

Admin

- Goals Requests:

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 - ▶ have a sense of where to go next
 - ▶ understand the full model workflow
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- Today: (Brief) Introduction $\rightsquigarrow$ Case Studies and Code in Response to Interest

Three Data Archetypes

- Experimental Data
we intervene, measure and analyze
- Designed Data
we measure and analyze
- Found Data
we analyze

- 1 Repurposing Big, Found Data
- 2 Case Study: COVID Risk Estimator
- 3 Case Study: Policing Data
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 - 2) do you understand how it was **collected**?
- **Record linkage** can be an important tool in bringing data together.
- Broadly speaking this week is about how to think about **not** getting exactly what you wanted.

Bigger Data $\neq$ Better Data

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- ▶ in my experience nonreactive data often comes with difficult construct validity.

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- ▶ what is it a sample of?
- ▶ risk of studying what is available instead of what is interesting.

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<https://www.economist.com/graphic-detail/2021/03/11/how-we-built-our-covid-19-risk-estimator> plus they provide code!
- Uses many of the techniques we have discussed.

All images on following slides credit to the Economist Write-up

Data Collection Effort

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
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- Aim: determine chances that someone diagnosed on December 1, 2020 would die by end of the year.


Overview of sample used for risk-estimator model



Sources: Covid-19 Research Database; *The Economist*

Number of people in covid-19 risk estimator sample, by age group, '000


■ Original sample ■ Randomly selected people in dataset assigned positive covid-19 test



Sources: Covid-19 Research Database; CDC; *The Economist*

Change in case-fatality rate as a result of data-augmentation procedure, by age group, %

Percentage-point change




and those involving large numbers of underlying conditions. In order to capture such complexity, we needed to allow for the possibility that comorbidities do not have constant effects that can simply be added together, but instead interact with each other, producing overall risk levels that are either higher or lower than the sum of their parts. As a result, we tested not just standard regression-based approaches such as logistic regression and proportional-hazards models, but also a range of machine-learning algorithms, ranging from the cerebral (dense neural networks) to the arboreal (random forests).

Of all of these methods, the one that performed best is called XGBoost, a common implementation of a family of algorithms called “gradient-boosted trees”. This tool often ranks high on leaderboards in data-science competitions. Gradient-boosted trees

Improvement of prediction by model type, compared with uniform case-fatality rate

Reduction in error* on unseen data, %


■ Hospitalisations ■ Deaths



Source: The Economist

XGBoost improvement in predicting deaths compared with logistic regression


Reduction in error* on unseen data, %



*Measured by binary cross-entropy

Death risk for someone diagnosed with covid-19 in the United States in 2020, actual v model prediction, %

● = Mean prediction of 4,000 patients in the data



Source: The Economist

Cleaning up after ourselves

Although gradient-boosted trees yielded the most accurate predictions overall, they do have a drawback. Because they do not impose assumptions about the relationships between variables and outcomes, they are just as likely to predict that adding a comorbidity or raising a person's age will decrease risk rather than increasing it, in the absence of evidence to the contrary. Sometimes, such counterintuitive behaviour can result from biases in the data, such as comorbidities potentially being more severe when they are the sole diagnosis than when they appear in conjunction with other illnesses. In other cases, it is the product of the model making poor guesses when presented with a type of patient that rarely or never appears in its training data.

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Police shootings per capita

Police kill a disproportionate number of black people

US population

BLACK

HISPANIC

WHITE

13%

17%

63%

All people killed by police

31%

12%

52%

People killed by policing while not attacking

39%

12%


46%

Data from the FBI's 2012 Supplementary Homicide Report

Alvin Chang/Vox

Slide Credit: Knox, Lowe and Mummolo

NYPD Stop and Frisk, 2003-2013



Slide Credit: Knox, Lowe and Mummolo

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- Administrative records are subject to extremely strong processes of **selection** and these cannot simply be shrugged off.
- Can we state a series of **necessary assumptions** and place **bounds** on quantities of interest?
- Much of the controversy here is around what is the **quantity of interest**?
- Key Takeaway: Enormous challenges not in the **methods** but in the **data**.

It is the most surprising
result of my career.
— Roland Fryer

An Empirical Analysis of Racial Differences in Police Use of Force

Roland G. Fryer Jr.

Harvard University and National Bureau of Economic Research

This paper explores racial differences in police use of force. On non-lethal uses of force, blacks and Hispanics are more than 50 percent more likely to experience some form of force in interactions with police. Adding controls that account for important context and civilian behavior reduces, but cannot fully explain, these disparities. On the most extreme use of force—officer-involved shootings—we find no racial differences either in the raw data or when contextual factors are taken into account. We argue that the patterns in the data are consistent with a model in which police officers are utility maximizers, a fraction of whom have a preference for discrimination, who incur relatively high expected costs of officer-involved shootings.

We can never be satisfied as long as the Negro is the victim of the unspeakable horrors of police brutality. (Martin Luther King Jr., August 28, 1963)

I. Introduction

From “Bloody Sunday” on the Edmund Pettus Bridge to the public beatings of Rodney King, Bryant Allen, and Freddie Helms, the relationship

This work has benefited greatly from discussions and debate with Chief William Evans, Chief Charles McClelland, Chief Martha Montalvo, Sergeant Stephen Morrison, Jon Murad, Lynn Overmann, Chief Bud Riley, and Chief Scott Thomson. I am grateful to David Card, Kerwin Charles, Christian Dustmann, Michael Geronstone, James Heckman, Richard Holden, Laurence Katz, Steven Levitt, Jens Ludwig, Glenn Looney, Kevin Murphy, Derek Neal, John Overdeck, Jesse Shapiro, Andrei Shleifer, Jorg Spengler, Max Stone, John Van Reenan, Christopher Winslip, and seminar participants at Brown University, University of Chicago, London

Electronically published April 22, 2019
[Journal of Political Economy, 2019, vol. 127, no. 5]
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


Slide Credit: Ian Lundberg

Perceived as **white**



Perceived as **black**



Fryer 2019. Fuller critique by Knox et al. 2020 and Durlauf and Heckman 2020.

Slide Credit: Ian Lundberg

Knox, Lowe and Mummolo 2020

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6. New research designs to avoid this pitfall

Slide Credit: Knox, Lowe and Mummolo

A causal mediation framework

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- Treatment (civilian is racial minority) $T_i \in \{0,1\}$
- Outcome (use of force) $Y_i \in \{0,1\}$
- Mediator (being stopped by police) $M_i \in \{0,1\}$

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- Outcome (use of force) $Y_i \in \{0,1\}$
- Mediator (being stopped by police) $M_i \in \{0,1\}$
- Racial bias in police stops ($T_i \rightarrow M_i$)
(e.g. Gelman, Fagan & Kiss 2007; Glaser 2014; Lerman & Weaver 2014; Goel, Rao & Shroff 2016)

Slide Credit: Knox, Lowe and Mummolo

Potential outcomes with mediation

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Normally we consider $Y(t \in \{Y(1), Y(0)\})$; potential force given race (treatment)

Instead consider $Y(t, M(t))$

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Normally we consider $Y(t \in \{Y(1), Y(0)\})$; potential force given race (treatment)

Instead consider $Y(t, M(t))$

$Y(1, 1)$ = potential use of force if minority civilian stopped

$Y(1, 0)$ = potential use of force if minority civilian not stopped

$Y(0, 1)$ = potential use of force if white civilian stopped

$Y(0, 0)$ = potential use of force if white civilian not stopped

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- Policing data: causal mediation problem (Fun)...
but with missing data on mediator (Double fun!)...
and missingness is of unknown scale (All the fun I can handle.)

Slide Credit: Knox, Lowe and Mummolo

Solution: principal stratification

If $T \rightarrow M$, four types of police-civilian encounters:

	$M_i(0) = 1$	$M_i(0) = 0$
$M_i(1) = 1$		
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What do we get to see in police data?

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What do we get to see in police data?
For white civilians...

Slide Credit: Knox, Lowe and Mummolo

Encounters (sightings) belong to one of four principal strata

always-stop	anti-black racial-stop	anti-white racial-stop	never-stop
$M_i(1) = M_i(0) = 1$	$M_i(1) = 1, M_i(0) = 0$	$M_i(1) = 0, M_i(0) = 1$	$M_i(1) = 0, M_i(0) = 0$

Slide Credit: Knox, Lowe and Mummolo

Within each, civilian is treated (black) or not (white)

always-stop	anti-black racial-stop	anti-white racial-stop	never-stop
$M_i(1) = M_i(0) = 1$	$M_i(1) = 1, M_i(0) = 0$	$M_i(1) = 0, M_i(0) = 1$	$M_i(1) = 0, M_i(0) = 0$
$\begin{array}{cc} / & \backslash \\ D_i = 0 & D_i = 1 \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{cc} / & \backslash \\ D_i = 0 & D_i = 1 \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{cc} / & \backslash \\ D_i = 0 & D_i = 1 \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{cc} / & \backslash \\ D_i = 0 & D_i = 1 \end{array}$

Slide Credit: Knox, Lowe and Mummolo

Very few potential outcomes appear in police data

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$Y_i(1, 1)$	$Y_i(1, 1)$	$Y_i(1, 1)$	$Y_i(1, 1)$
$Y_i(1, 0)$	$Y_i(1, 0)$	$Y_i(1, 0)$	$Y_i(1, 0)$
$Y_i(0, 1)$	$Y_i(0, 1)$	$Y_i(0, 1)$	$Y_i(0, 1)$
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/ \ $D_i = 0$ $D_i = 1$	/ \ $D_i = 0$ $D_i = 1$	/ \ $D_i = 0$ $D_i = 1$	/ \ $D_i = 0$ $D_i = 1$
$Y_i(1, 1)$	$Y_i(1, 1)$	$Y_i(1, 1)$	$Y_i(1, 1)$
$Y_i(1, 0)$	$Y_i(1, 0)$	$Y_i(1, 0)$	$Y_i(1, 0)$
$Y_i(0, 1)$	$Y_i(0, 1)$	$Y_i(0, 1)$	$Y_i(0, 1)$
$Y_i(0, 0)$	$Y_i(0, 0)$	$Y_i(0, 0)$	$Y_i(0, 0)$

Slide Credit: Knox, Lowe and Mummolo

Which causal effect?

- Prior work does not name specific causal estimands (e.g. Antonovics and Knight, 2009; Fryer, 2019; Nix et al., 2017; Ross, 2018; Ridgeway, 2006)
- Without naming an estimand, we can't consider identifying assumptions or evaluate validity of an analysis
- There are many causal effects:
 - ▶ Average Treatment Effect (ATE) in the population
 - ▶ Effect among those who interact with police ($ATE_{M=1}$)
 - ▶ Effect among minorities who interact with police ($ATT_{M=1}$)

Slide Credit: Knox, Lowe and Mummolo

Causal estimands

Stratum	D_i	M_i	$M_i(0)$	$M_i(1)$	$Y_i(1,1)$	$Y_i(1,0)$	$Y_i(0,1)$	$Y_i(0,0)$	ATE	$ATE_{M=1}$	$ATT_{M=1}$	$CDE_{M=1}$
Always-Stop	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
Always-Stop	0	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	0	0		0
Racial Stop	1	1	0	1	1	0	1	0	1	1	1	0
Never-Stop	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0			

Slide Credit: Knox, Lowe and Mummolo

Average Treatment Effect

$$ATE = \mathbb{E}[Y_i(1, M_i(1)) - Y_i(0, M_i(0))]$$

Stratum	D_i	M_i	$M_i(0)$	$M_i(1)$	$Y_i(1, 1)$	$Y_i(1, 0)$	$Y_i(0, 1)$	$Y_i(0, 0)$	ATE	$ATE_{M=1}$	$ATT_{M=1}$	$CDE_{M=1}$
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Always-Stop	0	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	0	0		0
Racial Stop	1	1	0	1	1	0	1	0	1	1	1	0
Never-Stop	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0			

Slide Credit: Knox, Lowe and Mummolo

Average Treatment Effect Among the Stopped

$$ATE_{M=1} = \mathbb{E}[Y_i(1, M_i(1)) - Y_i(0, M_i(0)) | M_i = 1]$$

Stratum	D_i	M_i	$M_i(0)$	$M_i(1)$	$Y_i(1, 1)$	$Y_i(1, 0)$	$Y_i(0, 1)$	$Y_i(0, 0)$	ATE	$ATE_{M=1}$	$ATT_{M=1}$	$CDE_{M=1}$
Always-Stop	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
Always-Stop	0	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	0	0		0
Racial Stop	1	1	0	1	1	0	1	0	1	1	1	0
Never-Stop	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0			

Slide Credit: Knox, Lowe and Mummolo

Average Treatment Effect Among the Treated and Stopped

$$ATT_{M=1} = \mathbb{E}[Y_i(1, M_i(1)) - Y_i(0, M_i(0)) | D_i = 1, M_i = 1]$$

Stratum	D_i	M_i	$M_i(0)$	$M_i(1)$	$Y_i(1, 1)$	$Y_i(1, 0)$	$Y_i(0, 1)$	$Y_i(0, 0)$	ATE	$ATE_{M=1}$	$ATT_{M=1}$	$CDE_{M=1}$
Always-Stop	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
Always-Stop	0	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	0	0		0
Racial Stop	1	1	0	1	1	0	1	0	1	1	1	0
Never-Stop	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0			

Slide Credit: Knox, Lowe and Mummolo

Controlled Direct Effect Among the Stopped

$$CDE_{M=1} = \mathbb{E}[Y_i(1, 1) - Y_i(0, 1) | M_i = 1]$$

Stratum	D_i	M_i	$M_i(0)$	$M_i(1)$	$Y_i(1, 1)$	$Y_i(1, 0)$	$Y_i(0, 1)$	$Y_i(0, 0)$	ATE	$ATE_{M=1}$	$ATT_{M=1}$	$CDE_{M=1}$
Always-Stop	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
Always-Stop	0	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	0	0		0
Racial Stop	1	1	0	1	1	0	1	0	1	1	1	0
Never-Stop	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0			

Slide Credit: Knox, Lowe and Mummolo

Assumption 1: Mandatory reporting

$$Y_i(d, 0) = 0$$

- If encounter not in the data, no force was applied
- Highly plausible for lethal/severe force
- Increasingly plausible for sub-lethal force given civilian oversight boards, cell phone cameras


Slide Credit: Knox, Lowe and Mummolo

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$\begin{array}{cc} / & \backslash \\ D_i = 0 & D_i = 1 \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{cc} / & \backslash \\ D_i = 0 & D_i = 1 \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{cc} / & \backslash \\ D_i = 0 & D_i = 1 \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{cc} / & \backslash \\ D_i = 0 & D_i = 1 \end{array}$
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Slide Credit: Knox, Lowe and Mummolo

Assumption 1: Mandatory reporting



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
Assumption 2: Mediator monotonicity

$$M_i(1) \geq M_i(0)$$

- No anti-white bias in stopping


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Assumption 3: Relative non-severity of racial stops

$$E[Y_i(d, m)|D_i = d', M_i(1) = 1, M_i(0) = 1] \geq \\ \mathbb{E}[Y_i(d, m)|D_i = d', M_i(1) = 1, M_i(0) = 0]$$

- Level of force applied in always-stop encounters (serious crimes) $\geq$ level applied in racial stop encounters on average

Slide Credit: Knox, Lowe and Mummolo

Assumption 3: Relative non-severity of racial stops

always-stop
 $M_i(1) = M_i(0) = 1$

$D_i = 0$	$D_i = 1$
$Y_i(1, 1)$	$Y_i(1, 1)$
0	0
$Y_i(0, 1)$	$Y_i(0, 1)$
0	0

anti-black
 racial-stop
 $M_i(1) = 1, M_i(0) = 0$

$D_i = 0$	$D_i = 1$
$Y_i(1, 1)$	$Y_i(1, 1)$
0	0
$Y_i(0, 1)$	$Y_i(0, 1)$
0	0

never-stop
 $M_i(1) = 0, M_i(0) = 0$

$D_i = 0$	$D_i = 1$
$Y_i(1, 1)$	$Y_i(1, 1)$
0	0
$Y_i(0, 1)$	$Y_i(0, 1)$
0	0

Slide Credit: Knox, Lowe and Mummolo

Assumption 3: Relative non-severity of racial stops

always-stop			anti-black racial-stop			never-stop	
$M_i(1) = M_i(0) = 1$			$M_i(1) = 1, M_i(0) = 0$			$M_i(1) = 0, M_i(0) = 0$	
/	\		/	\		/	\
$D_i = 0$	$D_i = 1$		$D_i = 0$	$D_i = 1$		$D_i = 0$	$D_i = 1$
$Y_i(1, 1)$	$Y_i(1, 1)$	$\geq$	$Y_i(1, 1)$	$Y_i(1, 1)$		$Y_i(1, 1)$	$Y_i(1, 1)$
0	0		0	0		0	0
$Y_i(0, 1)$	$Y_i(0, 1)$		$Y_i(0, 1)$	$Y_i(0, 1)$		$Y_i(0, 1)$	$Y_i(0, 1)$
0	0		0	0		0	0

Slide Credit: Knox, Lowe and Mummolo


Assumption 4: Treatment ignorability

$$\begin{aligned} M_i(d) &\perp\!\!\!\perp D_i \\ Y_i(d, M(d)) &\perp\!\!\!\perp D_i \mid M_i(0) = m', M_i(1) = m'' \end{aligned}$$

- No omitted variables with respect to mediator or outcome
- More plausible in recent years (data on lat/lon, time, officer and suspect features, etc.)


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Assumption 4: Treatment Ignorability



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Given assumptions 1-4, can we recover a causal estimate?

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$$\hat{\Delta} = \hat{\mathbb{E}}[Y_i | D_i = 1, M_i = 1] - \hat{\mathbb{E}}[Y_i | D_i = 0, M_i = 1]$$

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- Target the $ATE_{M=1}$ and $ATT_{M=1}$

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Can we estimate racial bias with police administrative data?

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
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Solution: bounds on effects!


Slide Credit: Knox, Lowe and Mummolo

Bounds on race effects, black vs. white




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Bounds on race effects, black vs. white




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
What is ρ ?

What is the share of minority stops that would not have happened if civilians had been white?

- Can be anywhere in $[0, 1)$. If $\rho = 0$, bias disappears.
- Two prior studies estimate this using data on “Stop, Question and Frisk” in NYC
- Gelman, Fagan & Kiss (2007) and Goel, Rao and Schroff (2016)
- Studies take totally different approaches
- Results imply ρ is at least .32 or .34, respectively
- We use $\rho = .32$ to be conservative

Slide Credit: Knox, Lowe and Mummolo

Bounds on race effects, black vs. white



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- Option 1: Identify situations with **race-blind contact with police** (e.g. rules for DUI stops; traffic stops and night; traffic accidents?)
- Option 2: Gather data on the non-stopped (e.g. traffic cameras, body camera footage)

Slide Credit: Knox, Lowe and Mummolo

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- Both questions require a clear sense of the task/goal to answer!

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EXAMPLE	RESPECT SCORE
FIRST NAME ASK FOR AGENCY QUESTIONS [name], can I see that driver's license again? It- it's showing <i>suspended</i>. Is <i>that-</i> that's you? DISFLUENCY NEGATIVE WORD DISFLUENCY	-1.07
INFORMAL TITLE ASK FOR AGENCY ADVERBIAL "JUST" All right, my <i>man</i>. Do me a favor, <i>just</i> keep your <i>hands on the steering wheel</i> real quick. *HANDS ON THE WHEEL*	-0.51
APOLOGY INTRODUCTION LAST NAME Sorry to stop you. My name's Officer [name] with the Police Department.	0.84
FORMAL TITLE SAFETY PLEASE There you go, <i>ma'am</i>. Drive <i>safe</i>, <i>please</i>.	1.21
ADVERBIAL "JUST" FILLED PAUSE REASSURANCE It <i>just</i> says that, <i>uh</i>, you've fixed it. <i>No problem</i>. Thank you very much, <i>sir</i>. GRATITUDE FORMAL TITLE	2.07

Fig. 3. Sample sentences with automatically generated Respect scores. Features in blue have positive coefficients in the model and connote respect, such as offering reassurance ("no problem") or mentioning community member well-being ("drive safe"). Features in red have negative coefficients in the model and connote disrespect, like informal titles ("my man"), or disfluencies ("that- that's").

Case Study: Respect and Formality in Policing




Fig. 4. Kernel density estimate of individual officer-level differences in Respect when talking to white as opposed to black community members, for the 90 officers in our dataset who have interactions with both blacks and whites. More positive numbers on the x axis represent a greater positive shift in Respect toward white community members.

- 1 Repurposing Big, Found Data
- 2 Case Study: COVID Risk Estimator
- 3 Case Study: Policing Data
- 4 Case Study: Respect and Formality in Policing
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HUMAN DECISIONS AND MACHINE PREDICTIONS*

JON KLEINBERG

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JURE LESKOVEC

JENS LUDWIG

SENDHIL MULLAINATHAN

Can machine learning improve human decision making? Bail decisions provide a good test case. Millions of times each year, judges make jail-or-release decisions that hinge on a prediction of what a defendant would do if released. The concreteness of the prediction task combined with the volume of data available makes this a promising machine-learning application. Yet comparing the algorithm to judges proves complicated. First, the available data are generated by prior judge decisions. We only observe crime outcomes for released defendants, not for those judges detained. This makes it hard to evaluate counterfactual decision rules based on algorithmic predictions. Second, judges may have a broader set of preferences than the variable the algorithm predicts; for instance, judges

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- An interesting and complex case. It is “easier” because one counterfactual is known—if the defendant is detained they cannot fail to appear.
- Three requirements: being clear about the link between predictions and decisions; specifying the scope of payoff functions; and constructing unbiased decision counterfactuals.

"It is telling that in our application, much of the work happens after the prediction function was estimated."

Data and Process

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- Train Gradient-Boosted Trees, 5-fold CV to select hyper parameters, retrain on all data afterwards.
- Don't train on any demographic other than age. Does this help? hurt?




FIGURE I

Partition of New York City Data (2008–13) into Data Sets Used for Prediction and Evaluation




FIGURE II

How Machine Predictions of Crime Risk Relate to Judge Release Decisions and Actual Crime Rates

TABLE II
COMPARING LOGISTIC REGRESSION TO MACHINE-LEARNING PREDICTIONS
OF CRIME RISK

Predicted risk percentile	ML/ logit overlap	Average observed crime rate for cases identified as high risk by:				
		Both ML and logit	ML only	Logit only	All ML cases	All logit cases
1%	30.6%	0.6080 (0.0309)	0.5440 (0.0209)	0.3996 (0.0206)	0.5636 (0.0173)	0.4633 (0.0174)
5%	59.9%	0.4826 (0.0101)	0.4090 (0.0121)	0.3040 (0.0114)	0.4531 (0.0078)	0.4111 (0.0077)
10%	65.9%	0.4134 (0.0067)	0.3466 (0.0090)	0.2532 (0.0082)	0.3907 (0.0054)	0.3589 (0.0053)
25%	72.9%	0.3271 (0.0038)	0.2445 (0.0058)	0.1608 (0.0049)	0.3048 (0.0032)	0.2821 (0.0031)

Notes. The table shows the results of fitting a machine-learning (ML) algorithm or a logistic regression to our training data set, to identify the highest-risk observations in our test set. Both machine-learning and logistic regression models are trained on the outcome of failure to appear (FTA). Each row presents statistics for the top part of the predicted risk distribution indicated in the first column: top 25% ($N = 20,423$); 10% (8,173); 5% (4,087); and 1% (818). The second column shows the share of cases in the top X% of the predicted risk distribution that overlap between the set identified by ML and the set identified by logistic regression. The subsequent columns report the average crime rate observed among the released defendants within the top X% of the predicted risk distribution as identified by both ML and logit, ML only, and logit only, and all top X% identified by ML (whether or not they are also identified by logistic regression) and top X% identified by logit.

5. In practice algorithms would be decision aids, not decision makers. Our calculations simply highlight the scope of the potential gains. Understanding the determinants of compliance with prediction tools is beyond the scope of this article, though recent work has begun to focus on it ([Dietvorst, Simmons, and Masey 2015](#); [Yeomans et al. 2016](#); [Logg 2017](#)).

28. This logistic regression uses the same set of covariates as are given to the machine-learning algorithm, using a standard linear additive functional form. Interestingly, estimating a model that adds all two-way interactions between the predictors causes the logistic regression model to overfit the training data set and predict poorly out of sample, even in a pared-down model with just 5 or 10 covariates. Many of these interactions seem to be picking up statistical noise in the training set, although the machine-learning algorithm is able to find the interactivity that reflects real signal.

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- Key takeaway: even for a relatively straightforward problem, there is a lot to think about!
- This is why a third of the class is about sources of **data**—huge considerations that arise from how we came to observe the data we had.
- Big data alone is **not sufficient** we have to understand the task and the process!

This Week in Review

This Week in Review

- Found or Repurposed Data
- Knox, Lowe and Mummolo 2020
- Voigt et al. 2017

Next Week:

Salganik Chapter 6 of *Bit by Bit*: “Ethics”

Lundberg et. al 2019 “Privacy, Ethics, and Data Access: A Case Study of the Fragile Families Challenge.” *Socius*